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Professor of Law, Delaware Law School, and Executive Director of Dignity Rights International.
1. MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING ix (2018).
2. Id. at 10.
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5RVHQ¶VEHDUVWKHVLPSOHEXWEURDGWLWOH³'LJQLW\´QDUURZHGQot at all by the subtitle
³,WV+LVWRU\DQG0HDQLQJ´,WSURPLVHVWREHDZLGH-ranging sweep across time and space,
and to deliver an answer that will finally give repose to the questions on the minds of many
philosophers and lawyers these days: what does dignity actually mean? Why are we all
talking about it all of a sudden? And what work can it actually do? If that is the implication
IURP WKH WLWOH RI 5RVHQ¶V ERRN KRZHYHU LW RYHUSURPLVHV D EHWWHU VXEWLWOH PLJKW EH
Understanding Certain Specific Questions about Dignity, from the Catholic and German
Perspectives. In fact, Rosen tells us that the book itself was spawned by a question from
KLVIULHQG&KULVWRSKHU0F&UXGGHQ ³WKHGLVWLQJXLVKHGKXPDQULJKWVODZ\HU´ ZKRDVNHG
KLP³RQHGD\RYHUFRIIHHµZKDWGRSKLORVRSKHUVKDYHWRVD\DERXW³GLJQLW\´"¶´5RVHQ¶V
DQVZHUZDV³µ(UQRWYHU\PXFKWKDW,NQRZDERXW².DQWSHUKDSV"¶´1 This vignette not
only provides the beginning of the story but the endpoint as well. This is not, it turns out,
a world tour or a deep history; rather, in 160 short pages, it provides a very wellconstructed three-part philosophic argument that answers a particular mental challenge
that Rosen has set for himself: Why, he wonders, should we respect the dead when they
GRQ¶W NQRZ LI WKH\¶UH EHLQJ UHVSHFWed?2 In solving this puzzle, he develops a certain
conception of dignity, one whose roots are firmly in the Kantian and Catholic traditions,
and that focuses on the moral duty we owe to ourselves and to others to retain our
humanity.
Along the way, Rosen does raise certain important issues²what is the core meaning

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 25 Side B

03/03/2020 13:59:43

DALY, E - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

198

2/18/2020 7:13 AM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:197

C M
Y K

03/03/2020 13:59:43

3. Id. at 114.
4. Id. at 77.
5. Id. at 147.
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RIGLJQLW\"+RZGRZHEDODQFHGLJQLW\¶VXQLYHUVDOLVPZLWKLWVDSSOLFDWLRQVLQSDUWLFXODU
situations and cultural contexts? Is dignity purely a secular concept or purely a religious
concept, or is it both? Does human dignity exist before birth, or after death? These are
LPSRUWDQW TXHVWLRQV VWLOO GHEDWHG WRGD\ VHYHUDO \HDUV DIWHU WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI 5RVHQ¶V
ERRN,WLVXQIRUWXQDWHWKDW5RVHQGLGQ¶WKDYHWKHEHQHILWRIWKHVXUJHLQSKLORVRSKLFDODQG
legal thinking about dignity rights that has spread throughout the world in the years since.
At times, Rosen seems completely in control of this difficult subject. He identifies
IRXUVWUDQGVLQ³WKHFRQFHSWXDOPDNH-XSRIGLJQLW\´²1) rank or status of human beings as
human beings, 2) the Kantian intrinsic value of moral law, 3) as measured and selfpossessed behavior, and 4) respectful treatment3²which become a bit of a leitmotif of the
argument. But of these, the first is outmoded, having been made largely obsolete by the
KXPDQULJKWVPRYHPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHGLJQLW\RIDOORIKXPDQLW\
and the third and fourth strands may have more to do with decorum than with any serious
sense of the word dignity as a legal or philosophic concept. Indeed, at times Rosen seems
WRWUHDWKLVRZQFKRVHQWRSLFDVLILWLVDVOLJKWFRQFHSWRIOLWWOHLPSRUW³>:@KDWLVOHVV
dignified than a two-year-ROG"´KHDVNV³2QHFRXOG,VXSSRVHDUJXHWKDWWKHFKLOGKDV
JUDFH%XWGLJQLW\"'HILQLWHO\QRW´ 4 But this misses the important point of dignity: only
in a colloquial sense is it associated with how high we hold our heads or how stoically we
bear our burdens. But in a philosophical and legal sense, it is so much more than that. It is
not a mere question of strength of character, but the very source of all human rights, and
perhaps their very purpose, and their means as well. Dignity is important precisely because
every two-year-old has it exactly in the same way, for the same reasons, and to the same
degree as does Rosen. The difficult philosophical question is why is that true? And the
GLIILFXOWOHJDOTXHVWLRQLVKRZGRZHWKLQNDERXWULJKWVLQDZD\WKDWUHVSHFWVHDFKSHUVRQ¶V
equal dignity, without making a mockery of the obvious differences between Rosen and
the two-year-old.
5RVHQ¶V ERRN LV VR SOHDVDQWO\ FRQYHUVDWLRQDO RQH ZDQWV WR LQWHUMHFW DQG DVN
questions as the argument evolves, sometimes about his meaning or the direction of his
argument and at other times about implications of his argument to current challenges and
FRQWURYHUVLHV LI ZH ZRQGHU DERXW WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI GLJQLW\ WR WKRVH ZKR GRQ¶W NQRZ
WKH\¶UHEHLQJEHQHILWHGDVGRHV5RVHQVKRXOGZHDOVREHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHGLJQLW\RI
future generations (and their entitlement to a planetary climate that would allow them to
OLYH " ,I GLJQLW\ XOWLPDWHO\ VWDQGV IRU WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH ³LQQHU NHUQHO RI LQWULQVLF
YDOXH´5 that every human being has, should we consider whether non-humans (such as
animals or rivers) are endowed with comparable kernels of worth? More broadly, how do
the four strands of dignity relate to current legal and political challenges? Are there other
meanings of dignity that would help us resolve some of the questions that courts are
continually faced with? For instance, the Constitutional Court of Germany²the court that
gets the most attention from Rosen²has wrestled intently with the question of how to set
a pension level, or a tax level, or a level of benefits for refugees such that people are able
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6. See, e.g., Bundesverfassunngsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 9, 2010, BVERFGE
125, 175 (Ger.) (concerning the fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with
human dignity); BVerfG, July 18, 2012, GBERFGE 132, 134 (Ger.) (applying a fundamental right to the guarantee
of a dignified minimum existence to German and foreign nationals who reside in the Federal Republic of
Germany).
7. ROSEN, supra note 1, at xv.
8. JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER¶S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 1 (2017).
9. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012).
10. WALDRON, supra note 8, at 3±4.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 2.
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to live with dignity.6 And many other courts around the world have also confronted, and
managed, more complex aspects of dignity, such as the balance between free speech and
protection of personal dignity of the targets of unwelcome speech, the living conditions of
prisoners, the extent to which health care is related to our capacity to live with dignity in
society with others, and so on. It is not obvious how these complex but important questions
ILJXUHLQWR5RVHQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHPHDQLQJRIGLJQLW\
2IFRXUVHZHVKRXOGQ¶WFULWLFL]Ha book because it answers some questions but not
others; it is always and only for the author himself to define the scope of his book. But the
conversational tone of the book²Rosen tells us that his purpose here is to try to persuade
us, his readers, of his argument7²invites engagement, questioning, and perhaps disputes
ZLWKWKHDUJXPHQWDVLIZHZHUHOLVWHQLQJWRKLVOHFWXUHDQGFRXOGQ¶WZDLWWRDVNTXHVWLRQV
DWWKHHQGEXWZKHQKHJHWVWRWKHHQGKHVLPSO\VD\V³WKDQN\RX´DQGZDONVRIIWKHVWDJH
But there is so much more to say!
7KDQNIXOO\ZHKDYH:DOGURQWRJLYHXVPRUH:DOGURQ¶VERRNLVIDUPRUHDPELWLRXV
and far more wide-ranging. With Waldron, you have a sense that if something he writes
does spark a question, he will get to it soon and give it more attention than even you
thought it deserved. The book is the result of a series of six Gifford Lectures delivered at
the University of Edinburgh in 2015, and it continues to be timely and thoughtful.
:DOGURQ¶V ERRN LV QRW E\ LWV WLWOH RU LWV RZQ VHOI-definition, about dignity. It is,
UDWKHU DERXW EDVLF HTXDOLW\ ³WKH SULQFLSOH WKDW KROGV WKDW ZH KXPDQV GHVSLWH DOO RXU
GLIIHUHQFHV DUH WR EH UHJDUGHG DV RQH DQRWKHU¶V HTXDOV´ 8 Although he has written
extensively and thoughtfully about dignity elsewhere,9 in this book, he says he confines
KLVXVHRIKXPDQGLJQLW\DVKHKDVHOVHZKHUH³WRFRQFHSWLRQVWKDWDWWULEXWHDKLJK and
distinctive status to humans, a status that is supposed to contrast with the moral
considerability of non-KXPDQDQLPDOV´10 ³+XPDQGLJQLW\´KHVD\VLQFRQWUDVWZLWKWKH
WKHVLV RI EDVLF KXPDQ HTXDOLW\ ³SUHVXSSRVHV DQ HTXDOLW\ RI ZRUWK RU VWDQGLQJ DPRQJ
humans, but it adds to that an additional stronger thesis²by which I mean a claim that
requires further defense²about distinctive hXPDQZRUWK´11
$QG\HWGLJQLW\LVXQGHQLDEO\WKHVXEWH[WRI:DOGURQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQVRPHWLPHVD
complement to basic equality, sometimes in contrast to it, but always there as a constant
companion, the understated side-kick who may turn out to have more substance than the
PDLQDWWUDFWLRQ$WWKHRXWVHWKHWHOOVXVWKDWKHEHOLHYHV³WKDWHDFKKXPDQOLIHDQGWKH
living of each human life has a high worth that is important and equal in the case of each
SHUVRQ´12 7KLV GRHVQ¶W VHHP SDUWLFXODUO\ HOHJDQW WR PH Eut it does provide a decent
ZRUNLQJGHILQLWLRQRIKXPDQGLJQLW\DQGLQ:DOGURQ¶VKDQGVLWJHWVWRWKHFRUHRIKLV
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13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
15. WALDRON, supra note 8, at 30.
16. Id. at 31.
17. See, e.g., James R. May & Erin Daly, Point of View: Why Dignity Rights Matter, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 129 (2019); see Database of National Constitutions with Dignity Provisions (2019),
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qTzxpkXyvnE3PTpj7PD8YwRF1IEsIQhzGMBNd3eWvxg/edit?usp=
sharing (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
18. See ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON
(Rogers M. Smith & Mary L. Dudziak eds., 2013); ERIN DALY & JAMES R. MAY, GLOBAL DIGNITY RIGHTS
CASEBOOK (W. S. Hein, forthcoming 2020).
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inquiry: what justifies this belief?
Waldron discounts the place of dignity in his thinking: he says he considers dignity
part of a cluster RIWHUPVDORQJZLWKEDVLFHTXDOLW\HTXDOZRUWKDQG'ZRUNLQ¶V³HTXDO
FRQFHUQDQGUHVSHFW´13 WKDWWRJHWKHUFRQVWLWXWH³DSRZHUIXOERG\RISULQFLSOH´ZKRVHD[HV
are both horizontal (entailing equality across all human persons, including the profoundly
disabled, the amoral, and the immoral) and vertical (entailing a distinction between all
humans at the top of the axis and all non-humans down the line).14 In later chapters, he
XVHV WKH WHUPV ³FRQWLQXRXV HTXDOLW\´ FRQWLQXRXV ³EHFDXVH LW GHQLHV WKH H[LVWHQFH RI
PDMRUGLVFRQWLQXLWLHVLQWKHKXPDQUHDOP´15 DQG³GLVWLQFWLYHHTXDOLW\´ ZKLFK³VD\VWKDW
QRWRQO\DUHKXPDQVRQHDQRWKHU¶VHTXDOVLQWKHFRQWLQXRXVVHQVHEXWDOVRWKH\DUHRQH
DQRWKHU¶VHTXDOVRQDEDVLVWKDWGRHVDFWXDOO\GLIIHUHQWLDWHWKHPIURPDQLPDOV´16).
But all of this maps directly on to the modern, global understanding of human
dignity, a conclusion put into relief when Waldron and Rosen are read in tandem. What
Rosen calls an intrinsic kernel of worth that resides in each person and what Waldron calls
distinctive equality sound like a simple understanding of human dignity as it has been
recognized in law over the last seventy years: the recognition of the inherent equal worth
of every person, everywhere.
This understanding of dignity, which is rooted in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), is now recognized in more than ten international human rights
instruments, in the foundational documents of the European Union, the Organization of
American States, and the African Union, and in more than five-sixths of all national
constitutions.17 Out of this positive law has emerged a vast global jurisprudence of dignity
from courts around the world, particularly in the last twenty years: courts in Argentina,
Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy,
Israel, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, and South Africa, among other
countries as well as regional courts, have decided scores and in some countries hundreds
of cases recognizing the foundational significance of human dignity as a guarantor of the
equal worth of every human being. These cases arise out of an astonishing range of factual
settings and raise claims concerning rights of association, freedom of speech, nondiscrimination rights, electoral rights, and rights relating to housing, education, pension,
health, working conditions, a healthy environment and protection against climate change,
prison conditions, procedural due process, sexual and gender identity, family unity, travel,
and more.18 Although neither the codified nor the decisional law establishes a clear
definition of human dignity, the overlapping consensus is exactly what Waldron calls
GLVWLQFWLYHHTXDOLW\ILUVWZHPXVWUHFRJQL]HZKDWPDNHVDOOKXPDQEHLQJVRQHDQRWKHU¶V
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19. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
20. WALDRON, supra note 8, at 31.
21. Id. at 64±65.
22. Id. at 41.
23. This also reflects the definition of dignity provided in the American Bar Association¶s recent affirmation
³that human dignity²the inherent, equal, and inalienable worth of every person²is foundational to a just rule
of law.´ Res. 113B, A.B.A. H.D. (2019).
24. See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 152±55 (discussing Barak¶s judgment in the torture case).
25. Id. at 251.
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equals, despite differences within the human race in physical, mental, and moral capacities,
inclinations, and accomplishments, and second, we must recognize that, despite these
GLIIHUHQFHVZLWKLQKXPDQLW\PHPEHUVRI³WKHKXPDQIDPLO\´DVWKH8'+5VD\V 19 are
entitled to recognition of their worth in a way that distinguishes them from all beings who
are not members of this distinctive family.
Waldron gives us a few more clues to suggest that he is really interested in dignity
ZUDSSHG XS LQ HTXDOLW\¶V FORWKHV +H DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW GLVWLQFWLYH HTXDOLW\ ³LV RIWHQ
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHSKUDVHµKXPDQGLJQLW\¶´DQGWKDW³>I@RUZKDWLWLVZRUWK,SHUVRQDOO\
DP D VWURQJ EHOLHYHU LQ GLVWLQFWLYH HTXDOLW\´20 And he uses the terms descriptive and
³SRVLWLYHHYDOXDWLYH´RU³QRUPDWLYH´RU³SUHVFULSWLYH´WRGHVFULEHGLIIHUHQWZD\VZHPLJKW
think about our judgments about equality. Like courage, basic equality can partake of both:
we observe equality and we believe it is good.21 From all of this (and many other
references to dignity throughout the book), we can only conclude that he is a strong
believer in human dignity both as a descriptive and prescriptive concept 22 but that,
nonetheless, he would rather leave dignity in the role of the sidekick and focus on equality,
the star of the show. And to be clear, my purpose in focusing attention on the confluence
of dignity and equality is not to suggest that they are identical or interchangeable qualities
or concepts. They are not. But simply to say that the particular way in which Waldron is
talking about equality (i.e. distinctive equality that treats all humans and only humans as
RQHDQRWKHU¶VHTXDOV PDSVSHUIHFWO\RQWRWKHZD\WKDWFRXUWVDQGRWKHUVKDYHEHHQWDONLQJ
about human dignity. 23 It is a cost of intellectual disciplinism that philosophers like Rosen
DQG:DOGURQGRQ¶WWDNHHQRXJKDFFRXQWRISKLORVRSKHU-jurists like Albie Sachs, Aharon
Barak, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, or the judges of the Colombian and German constitutional
courts who have developed a deeply theorized and coherent jurisprudence of dignity. 24
1RQHWKHOHVV:DOGURQ¶VERRNPDNHVUHIHUHQFHWRDQDUUD\ of philosophers, past and
present, who have sought to understand these same questions. Some of this is well trodden
ground, although even here, his insights are often fresh and thoughtful. Perhaps the most
challenging part of his argument comes in the last lecture, when he considers the question
(posed most provocatively by Peter Singer) of why people who are profoundly disabled
VKRXOGEHUHFRJQL]HGDVWKHHTXDOVRIWKRVHZKRDUHQRW:DOGURQ¶VUHVSRQVHLVLQSDUW
WKDW³WKRVHZKRVHOLYHVDUHOLYHGZLWKLQ the ordinary range of human functioning have a
basis for also recognizing as their brothers and sisters in human dignity those who have
WKHVHPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGIHDWXUHVRIFRQVXPPDWHGIUDJLOLW\DQGKXPDQPLVIRUWXQH´ 25
Another response to the conundrum may simply be that specieism matters. We can
think of this in two ways, one philosophic and one pragmatic (or intrinsic and extrinsic)
but both suggested in earlier sections of the book. The intrinsic reason emerges out of
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:DOGURQ¶V IRFXVRQ ORYH /RYHLVQRW an abstract quality like moral reasoning. Love is
profound and emotive and defining. And I would guess that most people who have ever
given birth or adopted a baby experience a love for their child that is not dependent on
their child showing a capacity for moral reasoning or personal autonomy but that has
everything to do with that child simply being a human being. (Many pregnant women
experience nightmares of giving birth to a fish or some other non-human being, and it is
not a happy dream!). We may be hardwired to love another human being simply by virtue
RI WKDW EHLQJ¶V KXPDQLW\ LQ D ZD\ WKDW LQFOXGHV KXPDQV RI all shapes and sizes and
potentialities but is far from the love we might feel for even the cleverest and most loyal
dog.
The other reason for accepting basic equality among all humans is more pragmatic.
7KHRSSRVLWHLVZKDW:DOGURQFDOOV³VRUWDOVWDWXV´²that is, categorizing legal subjects on
the basis of what sort of person they are.26 This is not, Waldron tells us, a good thing: it is
the basis of racism, sexism, and every other form of discrimination and oppression most
of us would now reject.27 But understanding why sorting people is wrong is the key to
understanding why distinctive equality is right. The problem with sorting is that someone
has to do it²someone has to decide which human beings are worthy and which are not²
or, as Waldron might say, where the limits of the range properly are: where is the line
between abled, disabled, and profoundly disabled (and there is no universally accepted
god who can accept this responsibility). Faced with this question, the drafters of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the ruins of the Holocaust, resoundingly
rejected this possibility. If there is no one who can be entrusted with drawing lines among
human beings, then no lines can be drawn; the only conclusion is that all members of the
KXPDQIDPLO\DUHERUQHTXDOLQGLJQLW\DQGULJKWVDQGWKXVDUHRQHDQRWKHU¶VHTXDOV
But Waldron is not trying to persuade us of a particular argument, but to lead us in
a long and challenging hike in the intellectual woods of his mind. Along the way, we must
FRQVLGHU ZKHWKHU SXUH ³UHDVRQ PRUDO DJHQF\ SHUVRQDO DXWRQRP\ DQG WKH FDSDFLW\ WR
ORYH´28 individually or in combination, warrants treating all humans and only humans as
RQHDQRWKHU¶VHTXDOV$WWKHHQGRIWKHGD\KRZHYHU:DOGURQIUDQNO\DGPLWVWKDWKHKDV
no clear answer to the conundrum of distinctive or basic equality. But that is ok²we had
a very interesting time exploring.
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26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 217.
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